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The Importance of the Sea
The seas surrounding Indonesia have shaped its history and will continue to play a 
major part' in determining the future course of its development. As an archipelagic 
nation, Indonesia's marine environment is a dominating physical reality. The sea makes 
up roughly two-thirds of the nation's total area. In addition to 2.7 million square 
kilometers of territorial waters, Indonesia's jurisdiction extends over a further 2.1 
million square kilometers of ocean as its Exclusive Economic Zone. Among the many 
resources found in this vast expanse, none—including, I would argue, oil and gas—is 
more important than fisheries resources. Fish provides more than 60 percent of the 
animal protein intake of the average Indonesian* 1 and is the only affordable source for 
the majority of the population. According to the Directorate General of Fisheries (DGF), 
approximately 1.3 million Indonesians are directly employed as fishers in the marine 
sector,2 with at least an equal number employed in various supportive roles, including 
boat building and fish processing, distribution, and marketing.3 In addition, fisheries 
products are becoming increasingly important as sources of export earnings.
Despite the importance of the fisheries sector to national welfare, most fishers are 
small-scale producers who are among the poorest of the poor in Indonesian society. 
Foremost among the reasons for this poverty is overfishing in key fishing grounds off 
Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi.4 Clear evidence of resource limitations notwithstanding, 
however, during the past two decades the Indonesian government has made a series of 
conscious policy decisions to encourage development of a modern and, by Indonesian 
standards, capital-intensive fishing industry. This article elucidates the rationale behind 
these national policies and provides an assessment of the role of international 
development agencies in influencing and supporting them.
As can be expected during any period of rapid technological and structural change, 
the benefits of fisheries development in Indonesia have not been equally shared. The
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1Biro Pusat Statistik, Neraca Bahan Makanan di Indonesia (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1982).
2DGF, Annual Fisheries Statistics, 1984 (Jakarta: Directorate General of Fisheries, 1986).
3Very few Indonesian women participate in fishing at sea. Women are, however, heavily involved in fish 
processing and marketing (Aminah and A. Wijayanti, Peranan Wanita dalam Kehidupan Sosial Ekonomi 
Masyarakat Nelayan di Daerah Nelayan Muncar, Banyuwangi-Jawa Timur (Jember, East Java: Universitas 
Negri Jember, 1980). There are no good data on the number of women who capture and collect marine 
products in shallow lagoons, on exposed coral reefs, and in other important coastal areas, or whether these 
activities are oriented towards subsistence needs or the cash economy.
4Conner Bailey, A. Dwiponggo, and F. Marahudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, ICLARM Studies 
and Reviews No. 10 (Manila and Jakarta: DGF, Marine Fisheries Research Institute, and the International 
Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management, 1987), Table 2.32, pp. 56-57.
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situation in Indonesia's fisheries sector is partly analagous to the impact of the Green 
Revolution, where landless laborers and limited resource farm households often gained 
relatively little from increased productivity and sometimes suffered from lost income 
and declining employment opportunities as a result of new agricultural technologies.5 
So too in the fisheries sector, improved technologies have benefited some at the expense 
of others. Indeed, it can be argued that the situation in fisheries is even worse than in 
agriculture because fishers directly compete with one another over a finite resource. 
Through the promotion of rapid technological change, fisheries development in 
Indonesia has become a zero-sum game, where those who control the most powerful 
technologies have a clear competitive advantage and individually prosper, even as 
others are swept aside and fish stocks depleted.
In this article, the argument is advanced that these policy outcomes were the direct 
consequence of choices favoring efficiency over equity, exports over domestic fisheries 
supply, and resource exploitation rather than resource management. These choices were 
driven by national economic priorities and supported by external development 
assistance agencies. The result has been the creation of a clearly identifiable dualistic 
industry structure in the fisheries sector through support given to domestic 
entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs, in turn, have invested in powerful new fishing 
technologies, most notably trawlers and purse seiners.6
The perspective of political economy provides the theoretical framework for analysis 
of development policy affecting Indonesia's fisheries sector. At its core, investigations 
into political economy focus attention on the interplay of key actors in shaping public 
policies which determine the allocation of scarce resources within society. The key actors 
in the present article include the DGF, the various international development assistance 
agencies, domestic entrepreneurs with investments in modern fishing units and fish 
processing facilities, and the mass of small-scale fishers who make up roughly 90 percent 
of total employment in Indonesia's fisheries sector.7 This latter group, far from being 
passive victims of technological progress, played an active role by forcing the 
government to impose virtually a complete ban on trawling in Indonesia after 1980. 
They accomplished this by engaging in widespread acts of violence, including the use of 
molotov cocktails, against wooden-hulled trawlers which encroached on their 
traditional fishing grounds. This trawler ban, to which we will return below, forced the 
government to pay closer attention to the traditional resource use rights of small-scale 
fishers. However, this action did not alter the basic course of development policy, which 
has continued to emphasize inccreasing production through the introduction of new, 
relatively capital-intensive technologies.
5See W. L. Collier, et al., The Acceleration o f Rural Development on Java: From Village Studies to a National 
P erspective  (Bogor: Agro-Economic Survey, 1982); F. Kasryno, Technological Progress and Its Effects on 
Income Distribution and Employment in Rural Areas: A Case Study in Three Villages in West Java, Indonesia 
(Bogor: Agro Economic Survey, 1981); B. L. M. Schiller, "The 'Green Revolution' in Java: Ecological, Socio­
economic and Historical Perspectives," Prisma 18 (1980): 71-93; J. C. Scott, Weapons o f the Weak: Everyday 
Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
6Trawlers and purse seiners in Indonesia typically are wooden-hulled boats displacing 30 gross tons and
powered by inboard diesel engines generating 100-200 horsepower. The trawl net is conically shaped and 
pulled through the water, usually at or near the bottom. Purse seiners use a net to encircle a school of fish 
swimming at or near the surface. After completing the circle, a rope or cable running through a series of rings 
at the bottom of the net is pulled tight, closing off the bottom of the net (the "purse") to prevent fish from 
escaping.
7Bailey, Dwiponggo, and Marahudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, Table 3.6, p. 87.
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The article begins with a brief review of resource potentials and limits, turning then 
to examine the symbiotic roles of the DGF and international agencies in shaping 
fisheries development policies in Indonesia. This is followed by a discussion of the 
dualistic industry structure which emerged in large part due to these policies. In the next 
two sections, the impact of violent protest by small-scale fishers on development policy 
is assessed and the argument made that policies of the 1980s represent continuity rather 
than change despite the dramatic issuance of the trawler ban. The concluding section 
addresses the central problem of balancing resource management and fisheries 
development in a manner that assures both biological sustainability and socially sound 
allocation of access to available fish stocks.
Resource Potentials and Limits
Marine fisheries are a biologically renewable resource that can be continuously 
exploited at a certain level without adverse effect on the stock. Beyond that point, 
putting more boats and nets in the water will not result in any increase in the catch; 
indeed, the opposite is likely to occur if stocks become depleted. Economically, the 
consequences of over-exploitation involve misuse of limited capital resources and the 
dissipation of resource rents available to society.8 Socially, the consequences include 
reduced employment opportunities, lowered incomes, and a likely reduction in the 
supply of fish to local consumers.9
A central problem of fisheries management is the absence of property rights limiting 
access to the resource. The free movement of people into fishing is possible because of 
the absence of property rights governing access to the resource. Fish are an open-access 
resource, freely available to anyone with the means to catch them. In Indonesia, easy 
entry into fishing is made possible by the relatively low capital requirements necessary to 
purchase a small used boat and simple fishing gear. Investment costs of representative 
small-scale fishing units (i.e., boats and nets) are shown in Table 1. In Indonesia, as 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia and many other tropical developing countries, the fisheries 
sector may be likened to a safety valve, absorbing surplus labor from other sectors of the 
national economy. The problem is that, as pressures on the resource increase, fishing 
becomes a competitive scramble that often leads to over-exploitation and the 
concentration of fishing power into the hands of relatively few people.
In its official pronouncements, the DGF minimizes the problem of resource limits, 
estimating total Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) for all marine resources within 
Indonesia's jurisdiction, including both territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, to be 6.5 million metric tons (mt) per year.10 In 1986, total marine fisheries catch 
was just over 1.9 million mt (Table 2), approximately 29 percent of this estimate.
8I. R. Smith, A Research Framework for Traditional Fisheries, ICLARM Studies and Reviews No. 2 (Manila: 
International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management, 1979).
9Conner Bailey, "Social Consequences of Excess Fishing Effort," in Proceedings, Symposium on the Ex­
ploitation and M anagement o f M arine Fishery Resources in Southeast Asia, Darwin Australia, 16-19  
February 1987, RAPA Report: 1987/10 (Bangkok: Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Food and Agri­
culture Organization, 1987), pp. 170-81.
1 0 DGF, Hasil Evaluasi Potensi Sumber Daya Perikanan Laut di Perairan Indonesia dan Perairan ZEE 
Indonesia (Jakarta: DGF, 1983).
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Table 1
Investment Costs and Average Annual Productivity of 
Typical Large- and Small - Scale Fishing Units
Subsector Type Cost Productivity 
(mt/unit, 1980)
Total Units 
(1980)
% National 
Catch (1980)
Large-Scale Trawler Rp 9,000,000 70.4 2,476 12.5
Purse Seiner Rp 15,000,000 38.0 3,700 10.1
Small-Scale Danish Seine Rp 956,000 6.7 2,884 1.4
Mobile Lift Net Rp 570,000 9.3 6,056 4.0
Set Lift Net Rp 275,000 6.5 13,082 6.1
Trammel Net Rp 334,000 10 24,803 3.6
Hand Line Rp 82,000 1.4 79,184 8.1
Sources: Bailey, Dwiponggo, and Marahudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, 1987, Tables 5.1 and 5.4, 
pp. 105, 111. Data on productivity per unit are national averages based on data for 1980, the last year before 
the trawler ban came into effect (DGF, Annual Fisheries Statistics, 1980).
Table 2
Indonesia's Marine Fisheries Sector: Landings, Fleet Composition, 
and Employment, 1969-1984
Year Landings
'000 mt % change
Fleet Composition 
Number % Motorized
Employment 
Number % change
1969 785 __ 280,633 1.9 n.a. __
1970 807 2.8 295,436 20 n.a. —
1971 820 1.6 284,838 25 n.a. —
1972 836 1.9 295,281 3.0 n.a. —
1973 889 6.2 242,882 5.1 n.a. —
1974 949 6.8 270,369 4.9 n.a. —
1975 997 5.1 257,152 5.8 n.a. —
1976 1082 8.5 245,725 7.1 811,512 —
1977 1158 7.0 248,544 8.2 815,947 0.5
1978 1227 6.0 248,113 10.5 831,965 2.0
1979 1318 7.4 257,905 12.4 833,997 2.4
1980 1395 5.8 271,856 16.5 970,731 16.4
1981 1408 0.9 295,627 23.6 1,104,649 13.8
1982 1491 7.5 300,549 28.3 1,170,864 6.0
1983 1682 7.3 307,057 28.1 1,226,643 4.8
1984 1713 1.8 313,640 29.9 1,294,472 5.5
1985 1822 6.3 316,446 30.2 1,286,448 <0.1>
1986 1923 5.5 318,095 31.1 1,357,279 5.5
Sources: DGF, Annual Fisheries Statistics 1982; DGF, Annual Fisheries Statistics 1986 (Jakarta: DGF, 1988).
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National leaders and top DGF officials frequently point to these figures to justify 
expanded investment in the productive capacity of the fisheries sector. However, the 
data upon which total MSY has been calculated are of uneven quality, and the resulting 
estimates seriously overstate realistically achieveable harvests. Roughly two-thirds of the 
DGF's resource estimate is based on indirect measures, such as level of primary 
productivity (i.e., nutrient levels in seawater, the assumption being that there are fish 
feeding on these nutrients), or extrapolations from other comparable fishing grounds for 
which data do exist.11 Moreover, these figures include resources said to exist either at 
great depths and/or in fishing grounds located at great distance from existing ports and 
markets.12 Even if one were to accept the DGF's estimates of MSY from these areas, the 
technical and economic feasibility of catching and marketing these resources is very 
much in doubt. Indonesian marine biologists, including those who work for the DGF 
and the Marine Fisheries Research Institute (a separate agency under the Ministry of 
Agriculture), realize the gulf between reality and official pronouncement but are 
powerless to point out the gross simplification of resource potentials touted by their 
political superiors.
Simply put, the DGF's official estimates of resource potentials are misleading. As 
guides to policy, these estimates are actually dangerous in that they encourage continued 
emphasis on production-oriented development programs. In the absence of adequate 
resource management capacity, these programs threaten to increase over-fishing. 
Moreover, overly optimistic assessments of resource potentials simply mask the fact that 
Indonesia must pay greater attention to resource management if development efforts are 
to be biologically sustainable.
The reality is that Indonesia's marine fisheries resources are unevenly exploited. 
Generally, shallow inshore fisheries, especially those close to major population centers 
(and hence markets), are heavily exploited and offer limited potential for expanded 
harvests. This is particularly true for the Malacca Straits, the north coast of Java, and 
South Sulawesi Province. Combined, these three coastal areas account for just over half 
of total landings and just under half of all those directly employed in the marine 
fisheries sector.13 Areas where the potential for increased production probably does exist 
are located in the sparsely populated eastern half of the archipelago, where local markets 
have limited capacity to absorb increased supply. Harvesting these resources for the large 
Java market will be possible only by breaking the control of that market by a tightly con­
trolled syndicate of ethnic Chinese dried fish wholesalers.14
The political economy framework is nicely suited to the fisheries policy arena, where 
competition over scarce resources is nearly universal. In this context, setting fisheries 
policy is a kind of balancing act, the goal of which is to achieve an appropriate balance
^B ailey, Dwiponggo, and Marahudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, pp. 19-21.
12Included as part of this estimate of sustainable yield are bottom-dwelling fish of the Banda Sea and the 
Indian Ocean, where extreme depths in excess of 3,000 meters are common. The only areas where reasonably 
reliable stock-assessment data are available are the Java Sea and the Malacca Straits, both of which are 
heavily fished and in some cases over-exploited.
13DGF, Annual Fisheries Statistics, 1984.
14Based on local production, per capita supply of fish on Java is roughly half the national average. No 
adequate data exist on inter-island trade in fish products. Most of this trade is in salted sun-dried fish and is 
controlled by the syndicate. Indonesians, including officials of the DGF with whom I worked during 1981-1982, 
referred to this group as a "mafia." Remarkably, no studies have been conducted on the extent of control over 
dry fish markets exerted by this syndicate, which is widely believed to use violence or the threat of violence to 
keep outsiders from penetrating the Java market.
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between resource management (the imposition of controls) and development (the 
promotion of growth in production). Policy makers have to decide between such 
contradictory goals as maximizing social benefits (e.g., employment and equitable 
income distribution) and promoting economic efficiency (e.g., through the introduction 
of powerful new technologies which replace labor with capital). At the same time, 
government policies call for simultaneously increasing domestic food supply while 
increasing exports of fisheries products. All of these goals are to be achieved while 
ensuring the biological sustainability of a resource vulnerable to over-exploitation. With 
slightly differing emphases, each of these five goals has been stated as official Indonesian 
policy in all four Five-Year Plans (Repelita) of the New Order era.15 Yet, in the context of 
resource sfcarcity, trade-offs between these goals must be made.
Institutional Symbiosis of National and External Agencies
The DGF is the government agency primarily responsible for both management and 
development activities. Viewed from the perspective of staff and financial resources 
committed, however, it is clear that the primary business of the DGF is the 
administration of development activities aimed at increasing production. Two-thirds of 
the DGF's total expenditures under Repelita IV (1983-1988) were allocated to increase 
marine and inland fisheries landings and aquaculture production; less than 3 percent 
was targeted for fisheries resource management and environmental protection.16
This allocation of funds may be short-sighted given the biological vulnerability of 
fisheries resources to over-exploitation, especially where powerful new fishing tech­
nologies are in use. However, it is an understandable approach if we view the DGF as a 
functioning bureaucratic entity engaged in strategies of organizational survival and 
expansion. The institutional interests of the DGF as a government agency are served if it 
enhances its standing within the Ministry of Agriculture and the government as a 
whole, defends its bureaucratic turf, and attracts external funds for staff and operations.
One way to accomplish these goals is to emphasize the growth potential of the 
fisheries sector. The DGF's emphasis on creating a "modern" fisheries sector—the 
launching of a Blue Revolution parallel to the Ministry's Green Revolution—provides a 
positive image of the fisheries sector's future. These efforts have focused primarily on 
the introduction of powerful new fishing technologies and the major infrastructural 
improvements needed to support this development. To this end the government has 
provided subsidized credit programs, port development projects, and research on the 
most efficient designs for boats and fishing gear, with the stated goal of "modernizing" 
the fisheries sector by encouraging the use of more powerful and profitable technologies. 
The DGF also has enthusiastically supported national efforts to expand non-oil exports. 
The DGF's emphasis on export-oriented development is mirrored by external 
development assistance agencies, which are able to justify their investments on the basis 
of potential foreign exchange earnings.
External assistance agencies have been very influential in shaping the direction of 
fisheries policies in Indonesia. During the early 1970s, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the World Bank, and the Japanese government loaned the Indonesian gov-
1:>Bailey, Dwiponggo, and Marahudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, p. 90.
16DGR, Annual Fisheries Statistics, 1980 (Jakarta: DGF, 1982).
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emment more than US$13 million to support the establishment of four parastatal enter­
prises to exploit tuna for export markets.12 In the mid- to late-1970s, the ADB and the 
World Bank provided credit to the fisheries sector for construction of new trawlers, as 
well as for the improvement of fishing ports, ice plants, and other infrastructure 
necessary to support trawlers and purse seiners. The Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) established a school for training captains, mechanics, and gear specialists to 
support these rapidly growing capital-intensive fishing enterprises. During the period 
1974-1983, external assistance totaling US$207.3 million was provided for fisheries 
development, almost half of which came from the ADB.* 18 In addition to these official 
assistance projects, foreign investors (primarily Japanese) invested US$64.5 million to 
establish joint-venture corporations with Indonesian counterparts.19
In addition to investments in new fishing units, these agencies have supported 
improving urban port facilities and fish distribution channels, most of which were 
designed to support large-scale offshore fisheries in areas where the DGF has identified 
potential for increased harvests.20 Small-scale fishers, whose technologies restrict them 
to coastal waters, are effectively excluded from this current phase of development. Of the 
total funds made available by international agencies for fisheries development, less than 
US$10 million has been devoted to the small-scale subsector. Funded from this money 
were two projects on extension methods for small-scale fisheries supported by the FAO, 
and projects by the German Technical Assistance Agency (GTZ) and the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID). Among foreign agencies involved during the 
1970s, only the GTZ provided assistance in developing resource assessment and 
management capabilities among their Indonesian counterparts.
The influence of external assistance agencies in fisheries development cannot be 
measured in terms of expenditures alone. Internationally supported projects generally 
involve matching contributions by the Indonesian government, effectively committing 
a significant proportion of limited human and financial resources available to the DGF 
for new program initiatives. The opportunity to work on an internationally supported 
fisheries development project is highly prized within the DGF itself, where working on 
such projects provides an important measure of prestige. Opportunities for international 
travel, training, and graduate education open the doors for professional advancement. 
Involvement in international projects also brings honoraria to supplement the meager 
salaries earned by Indonesian government officials. In short, internationally sponsored 
projects attract the best and brightest of available DGF staff through a combination of 
immediate gains and long-term benefits for career development.
Emergence of a Dualistic Industry Structure
Prior to the mid-1960s, the only people exploiting fisheries resources in Indonesia 
were small-scale producers, most of whom used sail or paddle powered boats and simple 
fishing gear. Most fishers in Indonesia still fit this basic description; nearly 70 percent of
12PT Perikanan Samodra Besar, Skipjack and Tuna in Indonesia (Jakarta: PT Perikanan Samodra Besar,
1981).
18ADB, Indonesia Fisheries Sector Study (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1983).
19Abdu Rachman, "The Development of Industrial Fisheries in Indonesia," Report prepared by the DGF 
(Jakarta, mimeo, 1982).
20ADB, Indonesia Fisheries Sector Study.
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all fishing boats in Indonesia are non-motorized (Table 2). The number of motorized 
boats gradually increased from the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, when a rapid growth 
in the use of engines occurred. Most of the motorized fleet are small-scale boats powered 
by outboard engines.21 However, over the past decades, technological changes have 
transformed the fishing industry into a dualistic one where small-scale producers have 
been progressively marginalized through the introduction of large-scale fishing units 
such as trawlers and purse seiners.22
The year 1966 represents a watershed marking the beginning of a new era of fisheries 
development in Indonesia. In that year, trawlers first were introduced into Indonesia by 
ethnic Chinese fishers from Riau Province, who had observed their effectiveness on the 
Malaysian side of the Malacca Straits.23 By the early 1970s, a second type of modem 
fishing unit, the purse seiner, made its appearance. The introduction of these modern 
technologies created opportunities for new entrants into the fisheries sector, most 
notably entrepreneurs from other sectors of the economy, who invested in trawlers and 
purse seiners.
Data on investment costs for trawlers and purse seiners, as well as for typical small- 
scale gear, are presented in Table 1. By Indonesian standards, both trawlers and purse 
seiners are relatively capital-intensive types of fishing units, requiring investments at 
least ten times greater than the most highly capitalized small-scale unit. The pay-off 
from these higher investments is a significant gain in productivity. In 1980, annual 
landings per unit averaged 70 mt for trawlers and 38 mt for purse seiners, while the 
national average for all types of fishing units was less than 4 mt.24 Since the mid-1960s, 
small-scale fishers have experienced significant changes in their own technology, 
including the increased use of outboard engines and the adoption of nylon netting. Yet 
even with these innovations, small-scale fishers continued to experience limited, and in 
many cases declining, productivity due to increased pressure on fish stocks. Twelve 
small-scale gear types representing 81 percent of all fishing units in Indonesia had 
average annual per unit landings of 3 mt or less and five (42 percent of the total) 
averaged 2 mt or less. Hand-lines, the least expensive and most common type of small- 
scale fishing unit, averaged only 1.4 mt of fish per year (Table 1).
Such low levels of productivity are a major factor in explaining poverty among many 
small-scale fishers in Indonesia. But blaming technological constraints for this poverty 
overlooks the more fundamental problem of a dwindling resource base, caused by the
21DGF, Annual Fisheries Statistics, 1984.
^ T h e  DGF divides the fisheries sector into small-, medium-, and large-scale subsectors, the latter referring to 
certain private corporations (including joint ventures) and state enterprises which operate steel-hulled vessels 
that are generally far larger and more powerful than the wood trawlers and purse seiners that are the focus of 
our attention here (and which the DGF refers to as "medium-scale"). These larger boats are relatively 
inconsequential in terms of numbers of boats (approximately 300 out of over 300,000 fishing boats), 
employment (0.6 percent of the national total), and landings (less than 2 percent of the total catch) (Bailey,
Dwiponggo, and Marahudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, Table 3.1, p. 65; pp. 66-67, 85, and 87). 
Moreover, because they typically operate in isolation from small-scale fishers, they have little impact on that 
group. The term "large-scale" is used here to describe trawlers and purse seiners to emphasize differences in 
level of investment and technological power that distinguish these from small-scale fishing units.
23r . G. Boudon, et al. Report on Costs and Earnings Survey o f Malaysian Trawl Fisheries, 1969-70  (Kuala 
Lumpur: Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, 1970); M. Unar, Review of the Indonesian Shrimp Fishery and Its 
Present Development, Laporan Penelitian Perikanan Laut 1 (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Perikanan Laut, 
1972).
24Bailey, Dwiponggo, and Maharudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, Table 3.5, p. 84..
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by the introduction of trawlers and purse seiners and the intrusion of these modern 
boats into coastal waters, the traditional fishing grounds of small-scale fishers.
Relative investment cost and differential levels of productivity are not the only 
major differences between small- and large-scale fisheries. Equally important, if we are to 
understand these two classes of fishers, are the fundamental differences in values and 
motivations that distinguish them. Owners of large-scale fishing units are commercially 
oriented entrepreneurs whose goals are profitability and capital accumulation. The 
combination of productive power represented by modern technologies and the behavior 
of economically "rational" individuals, who seek to maximize personal gain even at the 
expense of collective loss through over-exploitation, has been the primary factor 
contributing to the over-exploitation of marine resources in Indonesia. Under 
conditions of open access to the resource, Hardin's classic statement of the "Tragedy of 
the Commons" becomes all too true.25
Small-scale fishers also exert heavy pressure on marine resources, but this is 
attributable less to a combination of mechanized fishing power and profit-seeking 
behavior than to the sheer numbers of people involved. Small-scale fishers are no less 
rational economically than their large-scale counterparts, but what constitutes rational 
behavior among this group has to be understood in the context of their particular 
circumstances. Traditional fishing technologies are inextricably linked to the values of 
local fishing communities, and these in turn shape a wide range of social and economic 
relationships. Profitability and capital accumulation are only two goals among many. 
Careful examination of sharing systems among small-scale Indonesian fishers clearly 
shows that non-economic factors often shape the social relations of production, mitigat­
ing the harsher aspects of purely economic factors.26
Firebombs and Fish
By 1980, trawlers and purse seiners combined accounted for 23 percent of total marine 
fisheries landings (Table 1), although they represented only 2 percent of the nation's 
fishing fleet.27 During the 1970s, trawlers and purse seiners were most heavily 
concentrated along the north coast of Java and in the Malacca Straits (Figure 1), where 
they made up 3 percent of the boats but accounted for 39 percent of the total catch.28
By the end of the 1970s, the rapid growth of large-scale fisheries, especially of trawlers, 
led to serious problems of resource depletion along the Malacca Straits and the north 
coast of Java, fishing grounds which for centuries had provided a livelihood for large 
numbers of small-scale fishers. On the north coast of Java in 1980 there were 266,000 
fishers, most of whom were totally dependent on fishing for their livelihoods.29 Most of 
these were small-scale fishers who operated in direct competition with trawlers in 
attempting to catch demersal (i.e., bottom dwelling) species such as shrimp.3® Shrimp are
25G. Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162 (1968): 1243-48.
26Aminah and Widjayanti, Peranan Wanita dalam Kehidupan Sosial Ekonomi.
27DGF, Rancangan Pembangunan Pertanian Repelita IV, Sub-sektor Perikanan (Jakarta: DGF, 1982).
28Bailey, Dwiponggo, and Maharudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, pp. 21-22; Table 2.6, p. 23.
29DGF, Rancangan Pembangunan.
3®ln the three areas most directly affected by trawlers (Malacca Straits and north and south coasts of Java) 
there were in 1980 a total of 57,772 small-scale demersal fishing gear, representing roughly 50 percent of the 
total (DGF, Annual Fisheries Statistics 1982). Average crew sizes for demersal and non-demersal gear are
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F igure  1
DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER TRAWLING IN INDONESIA : 
NUMBERS OF UNITS AND LANDINGS, 1975-1980
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by far the most valuable of these demersal species because of strong international 
demand. Before they were banned, trawlers operated primarily in shallow coastal waters 
where shrimp are most abundant. Exact data are unavailable, but a reasonable estimate is 
that 80 percent of all shrimp exported from Indonesia during the 1970s were caught by 
trawlers.* 31 During the ten year period 1977 through 1986, average annual export earnings 
from fisheries products were over US$240 million, with frozen shrimp accounting for 
roughly 80 percent of this value (Table 3).
In Indonesia, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, trawling through coastal waters fre­
quently led to the destruction of nets and traps set by small-scale fishers and occasionally 
to the ramming of small boats, with a resulting loss of life and property.32 Trawling in 
shallow coastal waters also had devastating effects on fish stocks. Coastal waters serve as 
the nursery grounds for many commercially valuable species of fish. In the process of 
dragging the trawl net through the water, large numbers of sexually immature and 
undersized fish were caught (and generally turned into animal feed). This disruption of
roughly the same; thus, we can estimate that 193,000 small-scale fishers (50 percent of the total in these areas) 
were directly affected by trawler operations. Average household size among small-scale fishers is over 5.0 
(Bailey, Dwiponggo, and Marahudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries), indicating that approximately 
one million people were affected by competition with trawlers in these three areas.
^Small-scale fishers caught more than 20 percent of all shrimp landed, but relatively little of this went into 
the export market. Shrimp packers for export based their operations in major fishing ports where trawlers 
were based and relied almost exclusively on these trawlers for their supply. When trawlers were banned from 
most parts of Indonesia, these same packers were forced to obtain supplies of shrimp for export from coastal 
fishing communities, providing small-scale fishers access to world markets and higher prices.
^C onner Bailey, The Sociology of Production in Rural Malay Society (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 
1983); T. Panayotou, "Economic Conditions and Prospects of Small-scale Fishermen in Thailand," M arine 
Policy 4, 2 (1980): 142-46; I. Sardjono, 'Trawlers Banned in Indonesia," ICLARM Newsletter 3, 4 (1980): 3; Smith, 
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the reproductive cycle contributed significantly to the problem of resource depletion.33 
As a result of over-exploitation and resource depletion, trawlers suffered declining catch 
rates during the latter half of the 1970s.34 Nonetheless, their operations remained prof­
itable because of the high prices paid for shrimp on thle international market. Small-scale 
fishers along the Malacca Straits and the north coast of Java, however, found themselves 
increasingly unable to compete over a dwindling resource base.35
Table 3
Indonesian Fisheries Exports
Year
Shrimp
US$
'000 mt Million
Tuna
US$
'000 mt Million
Other
US$
'000 mt Million
Total
US$
'000 mt Million
1977 31.6 140.2 1.9 0.02 24.1 22.8 57.6 163.0
1978 32.6 162.0 9.4 6.2 21.5 25.2 63.5 193.4
1979 34.7 200.5 9.8 8.0 23.8 28.3 68.3 236.8
1980 31.9 180.9 11.1 12.9 35.7 32.6 78.7 226.4
1981 25.0 162.8 14.0 15.4 36.2 47.2 75.2 225.4
1982 25.6 181.6 18.8 19.9 45.2 47.9 89.6 249.4
1983 26.1 194.4 20.3 14.8 42.0 47.8 88.4 257.0
1984 28.0 195.6 14.7 10.7 33.0 41.8 75.7 248.1
1985 31.0 202.7 17.9 13.8 35.6 42.9 84.5 259.4
1986 36.1 284.9 24.2 18.1 47.1 71.1 107.4 374.1
Source: DGF, Statistik Ekspor & Impor Hasil Perikanan, 1986 (No. 9, STAT.EKS.IMP) (Jakarta: DGF, 1986).
Small-scale fishers responded to these threats to their lives and livelihoods with 
violence, including use of molotov cocktails and other weapons.36 No reliable estimates 
exist regarding the number of people killed or boats sunk. From interviews conducted by 
the author during 1981-1982 in fishing communities in the affected areas, and with 
government officials working in those areas, it is clear that the violence was widespread 
and serious. In Malaysia, where similar problems arose, more than sixty boats were sunk 
and twenty-three fishers killed during the period 1970-1973.37
In Indonesia, the government first responded to this violence by issuing a series of 
regulatory measures designed to restrict trawlers from operating in coastal waters. These
33T. Azhar, Some Preliminary Notes on the By-catch o f Prawn Trawlers off the West Coast o f Peninsular 
Malaysia (Manila: South China Sea Fisheries Development and Coordinating Programme, 1980).
34Bailey, Dwiponggo, and Marahudin, Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries, pp. 21-25; 27-32; 38-41.
35Conner Bailey, "Government Protection of Traditional Resource Use Rights—The Case of Indonesian 
Fisheries," in Community M anagement; Asian Experience and Perspectives, ed. David C. Korten (West 
Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1986), pp. 292-308.
36Ibid.; A. F. LaPorta, "Pribumi Fishermen and the Trawlers," Unclassified letter to US Embassies in Jakarta 
and Kuala Lumpur from US Consulate in Medan, dated December 5, 1978; N. Naamin, M asalah-masalah 
yang dihadapi dalam Pelaksanaan KEPRES 39/1980 tentang Penghapusan Penggunaan faring Trawl (Jakarta: 
Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Perikanan, 1982); Sardjono, 'Trawlers Banned in Indonesia."
37D. S. Gibbons, "Public Policy towards Fisheries Development in Peninsular Malaysia: A Critical Review 
Emphasizing Penang and Kedah," Kajian Ekonomi M alaysia 13, 1 & 2 (1976): 89-121; Smith, R esearch  
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efforts, which involved increasingly stringent restrictions (especially on trawlers), failed 
due to inadequate enforcement capabilities. The profits from illegal trawling for shrimp 
were too attractive and the enforcement effort too weak for these restrictions to have any 
significant effect.
In the face of continued violence, the government imposed a total ban on all 
trawling in waters off Java and Sumatra through promulgation of Presidential Decree 
No. 39 of 1980. This ban was extended nationwide, with the exception of the Arafura Sea, 
by Presidential Letter of Instruction 11, effective January 1983.33 One result of the trawl 
ban was an immediate but short-lived decline in shrimp exports, which subsequently 
reached new highs (Table 3). The removal of trawlers also led to an immediate surge in 
employment, particularly among small-scale fishers (Table 2).
Presidential Decree No. 39 is a remarkable document given the national drive to 
increase non-oil export earnings. Trawlers had accounted for most shrimp destined for 
export markets. Indonesia's trawler ban also is remarkable because, unlike previous 
efforts to restrict trawlers (in Indonesia or anywhere else in the Third World), this decree 
has been effectively enforced. This can be explained in part because it is relatively easy to 
impose a total ban on all trawling, as compared to imposing restrictions on trawling to 
certain areas or seasons. More important, the issuance of a Presidential Decree was a 
statement of political will which put the weight of the government and the military 
behind enforcement efforts.
The more intriguing question is, why did the government take this action in the first 
place? In part, the answer may be found in the growing concern among researchers and 
administrators alike regarding resource sustainability and the plight of small-scale 
fishers.* 39 In addition, several influential politicians working through the Himpunan 
Nelayan Sa-Indonesia (HNSI, All-Indonesia Fishers' Association) identified themselves 
with this cause and lobbied for government action. The HNSI is a "functional 
organization" associated with Golkar, the governing "party" of Indonesia. Like other 
such groups, the HNSI serves to articulate interests of a certain category of citizens to the 
government and provides group leaders with a political power base. Government 
responsiveness to the needs of such groups and their leaders serves to build and 
maintain political support. But, in the final analysis, the government was forced to act 
because of the willingness of numerous small-scale fishers to use violence as a means of 
defending their interests.
Fisheries Policies During the 1980s
The elimination of trawlers beginning in 1980 initially reversed the decade-long 
trend towards the concentration of fishing power. However, many trawler owners and 
other investors quickly shifted over to purse seiners, which increased in numbers from 
3,700 in 1980 to over 5,000 by 1984.40 Purse seiners have become particularly significant
3®The Arafura Sea was excluded due to the existence of long-term agreements under which joint-venture
corporations (primarily Japanese-Indonesian) operated large steel-hulled trawlers in that area. These larger
vessels appear not to have had a serious impact on local small-scale fisheries of this sparsely populated area.
39Sardjono, Trawlers Banned in Indonesia.
40DGF, Rancangan Pembangunan Pertanian; DGF, Annual Fisheries Statistics, 1984.
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along the north coast of Java, where in 1984 they accounted for over 36 percent of total 
landings but only 2.5 percent of boats in the fishing fleet.41
As important an act as was the trawler ban, Presidential Decree No. 39 did not result 
in a significant shift in the government's development priorities. There was, however, a 
shift in strategies. Since 1980, the focus of the DGF's attention has shifted away from 
almost exclusive- emphasis on the marine sector. Increased attention is now being 
devoted to brackish-water shrimp production in coastal ponds (tambak). Indonesia is 
trying simultaneously to intensify production in existing ponds and extend tambak 
production of shrimp into new areas, to counterbalance the decline in shrimp exports 
resulting frpm the trawler ban.
Indonesia currently has nearly 200,000 hectares of tambak in production,42 mostly 
operated using simple production techniques in use for hundreds of years. During 
certain seasons, post-larval shrimp (Penaeus spp.) and milkfish (Chanos chanos) fry are 
abundant in coastal waters. The traditional system utilizes tidal action to carry these 
organisms through dug channels into a pond, where they are trapped and allowed to 
grow until they reach harvest size (roughly six months). Little or no supplemental 
feeding is provided. Rather, the shrimp and fish depend on nutrients brought into the 
pond with the tides. The system requires limited cash expenditures to operate once the 
ponds are in place. This low-cost approach is well suited to small-scale producers.
The DGF has made shrimp mariculture development its number one priority and 
has urged external development agencies to provide support in this field. As a result, 
during the mid-1980s, the ADB, the World Bank, USAID, and the governments of both 
Belgium and Italy, have provided funding for production of shrimp in tambak.43 The 
ADB alone has made a loan of US$50 million to the Indonesian government for 
intensifying and expanding pond production of shrimp.
The social and ecological consequences of focusing on increased production of 
shrimp in tambak parallel those of capital-intensive marine fisheries development. Most 
official effort is directed towards increasing production through capital-intensive systems 
beyond the financial and technical abilities of small-scale producers. Moreover, in the 
process of encouraging rapid development of pond-produced shrimp, large areas of 
mangrove in Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and the south coast of Java are being cleared. 
Massive mangrove conversion threatens the sustainability of marine harvests of shrimp 
and other valuable commercial species which are dependent upon mangrove habitat 
during critical periods in their life cycles.44 Conversion of mangrove to shrimp ponds 
also threatens the livelihood of rural residents who depend on mangrove resources for 
firewood, charcoal, lumber and roofing materials, fruits, shellfish, and fish. In short, 
clearing mangrove to build ponds involves converting a multiple-use resource vital to 
the livelihoods of many coastal communities into a single-use resource that becomes the
41 DGF, Annual Fisheries Statistics, 1984.
42Ibid.
4^Conner Bailey, et al., Aquatic Resources Development Feasibility Study, 2 vols. (Diamond Springs, Calif.: 
Resources Development Associates, 1985).
44P. Martosubroto and N. Naamin, "Relationship between Tidal Forests (Mangroves) and Commercial 
Shrimp Production in Indonesia," Marine Research in Indonesia 18 (1977): 81-86; R. E. Turner, "Intertidal 
Vegetation and Commercial Yields of Penaeid Shrimp," Trans. American Fisheries Society 106, 5 (1977): 411— 
16.
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private property of a wealthy individual or corporation.45 "Large-scale aquaculture 
enterprises frequently displace small-scale fishers and aquaculturists through subsidized 
financing and institutional arrangements that favor the large-scale or corporate 
investor," according to Smith and Pestano-Smith.46
Conclusion
The first step in formulating sustainable and socially equitable fisheries development 
policies is to recognize resource limitations and to realize that hard choices must be 
made. Indonesia's trawler ban is an example of such a choice. In 1980, a conscious 
decision was made to protect the interests of small-scale fishers by eliminating this 
highly productive class of fishing vessel. Such dramatic actions against the rich and for 
the poor are sufficiently rare to be remarkable. However, with the notable exception of 
the trawler ban, fisheries policies in Indonesia over the past twenty years have been 
largely indistinguishable from those elsewhere in Southeast Asia or the rest of the Third 
World. Minimal effort has been expended on resource management, largely due to 
wildly optimistic official estimates of resource potentials. As a result, economic and 
political pressures have led to policies which emphasized expanded production rather 
than resource management.
From the perspective of the DGF, development is synonymous with increasing 
production. The introduction of new capital-intensive technologies—whether in 
marine fisheries or shrimp mariculture—is seen as the best way of achieving this goal. 
The DGF continues to focus on production rather than management and capital- 
intensive technologies rather than distributional equity. Yet, fisheries development 
efforts make little sense unless they are socially beneficial and are designed to be 
sustainable over time. Resource scarcity and the social disruption caused by rapid 
technological innovation make it necessary to integrate and balance production-oriented 
development projects with resource management policies that address fundamental 
issues of resource allocation and equity.
International development agencies have contributed significantly to the pro-growth 
orientation of national fisheries policy in Indonesia and are in a position to exert 
considerable leverage over the future direction of this sector's development. This could 
be a positive or negative influence. There is a natural tendency among external 
development agencies to evaluate more positively project proposals that promise 
expanded production rather than those which seek to place limits on production. Yet, 
within Indonesia's fisheries sector, some limits must be established to ensure that the 
development that does take place is biologically sustainable and socially just. External 
agencies are in a position to influence policy by supporting those development efforts 
which not only meet fiscal and technical criteria but also serve these broader goals.
45Conner Bailey, 'The Social Consequences of Tropical Shrimp Mariculture Development," Ocean and 
Shoreline Management 11 (1988): 31-44.
45I. R. Smith and R. Pestano-Smith, "Social Feasibility of Coastal Aquaculture," 1CLARM Newsletter 8, 3
(1985): 6-8.
